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
 
 
Separation of powers and constitutional thought – and indeed practice – enjoy an uneasy 
relationship in the United Kingdom, with evidence of the apparent centrality of the doctrine 
to the constitution
1
 as commonly found as evidence of its irrelevance.
2
 The contested nature 
of the doctrine is attributable to a number of factors: the physical “fusion” of the elected 
branches of government,
3
 the absence of a documentary constitution prescribing the organs of 
government and their functions,
4
 the lack of a clear tradition of legal control on government
5
 
and differing visions of the aims and purpose of separation of powers itself.
6
 Yet accounts of 
the United Kingdom constitution have rarely been able to completely omit analysis of the 
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doctrine.
7
 This is partially for the reason that notions of mixed government and/or the 
balanced constitution – ideas which have proved influential in constitutional discourse – can 
be seen to serve the same aims as separation of powers through less visible divisions between 
institutions and governmental functions.
8
  
Despite uncertainty over the influence of separation of powers in the United 
Kingdom, ideas associated with the doctrine have recently enjoyed something of a 
renaissance.
9 
 Separation of powers has (re)surfaced as an instrument of constitutional 
argumentation providing a facilitating framework for constitutional debate and is increasingly 
invoked in support of decision-making in the politico-legislative arena.
10
 The structural 
changes engineered by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 in particular have contributed to a 
more tangible separation of powers within which the judicial branch has emerged as both 
stronger
11
 and institutionally independent of its elected counterparts.
12
 
Specifically, it has been suggested that “the courts have begun to talk of the 
separation of powers in more juridical terms.”13 While assertions of a rudimentary separation 
of functions between the core institutions of government may well have been occasional 
features of twentieth century judicial decisions,
14
 assertions of the fundamentality of 
                                                 
7
 Even S.A. De Smith did not reject the influence of the doctrine outright, and was forced to concede that “a 
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separation of powers have become more commonplace in recent times.
15
 Separation of 
powers is not only revealing itself as an influential factor in macro-level constitutional 
renovation but is also argued to show increasing signs of enforceability in the micro-level 
processes of litigation.  
Recognising this “rehabilitation” of separation of powers into United Kingdom 
constitutional discourse,
16
 this piece seeks to unpick the extent to which the doctrine operates 
as a normative influence on judicial decision-making. We seek to examine whether the 
increased prominence of separation of powers discourse also reveals a convergence around 
the normative influence, or influences, of an increasingly judicialised doctrine. Our argument 
is that beneath the veneer of uncertainty and imprecision can be found four co-existing (and 
non-mutually exclusive) understandings of separation of powers, with each broadly reflective 
of a judicial philosophy of accountability and of a particular understanding of the judicial 
function within the constitution. The paper proceeds by assessing the constitutional dynamics 
of the separation of powers, presenting a version of separation of powers that evidences a 
shift away from the doctrine’s traditional, and relatively static, institutional stipulations, 
without losing sight of the imperative that governmental powers are divided amongst 
institutions. We then turn to the core of our argument, detailing the manifestation of the four 
variants of separation of powers in judicial discourse and examining the relative 
constitutional position of judicial power evident in each model. Our analysis identifies the 
following core variations of separation of powers evident in judicial reasoning: (i) a 
hierarchical, or sovereignty-endorsing, variant; (ii) a weakly normative variant; (iii) a 
strongly normative variant; and (iv) a vision of separation of powers as a constitutional 
fundamental. The final part of the paper situates separation of powers within the broader 
constitutional order, explaining the internal coherence and context-sensitivity of the outlined 
variants. The paper is decidedly juristic in outlook, both in its attempts to unpick the 
legalisation of separation of powers and in acknowledging that a degree of enforceability is 
central to the elevation of separation of powers from a merely explanatory to a normative 
device.  
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From a Rigid to a Flexible Model of Separation of Powers 
A tendency to ascribe fixed meaning to the institutional requirements of separation of powers 
has obscured the various ways in which the doctrine has found purchase in the development 
of the United Kingdom constitution. A perceived absence of clarity has similarly seen the 
doctrine criticised for its inability to accurately reflect or prescribe constitutional practice.
17
 
Our argument treats this mutability as a basis from which to examine how various 
understandings of the doctrine operate and influence constitutional understanding, rather than 
as a reason to reject separation of powers as constitutionally irrelevant. Though recent 
constitutional developments have contributed to the sense that separation of powers has 
greater purchase within the United Kingdom constitution than hitherto, the precise extent to 
which the doctrine exerts normative influence remains a point of uncertainty. Primarily, this 
can be attributed to two factors: (i) the traditional absence of appropriate constitutional 
divisions of power between the institutions of government and (ii) a tendency towards 
understanding separation of powers – in spite of its alleged doctrinal imprecision – as 
prescriptive of a relatively inflexible institutional template.
18
  
As to the first of these, the “fusion” of the executive and legislative branches remains 
indicative of the subsidiary nature of separation of powers concerns within the Westminster 
model. It follows that the concerns of a tripartite separation of powers did not significantly 
impact upon the establishment of core institutional relationships within the constitution.
19
 
Additional inter-institutional connections have prompted the dismissal of separation of 
powers as constitutionally redundant; the pre-2005 incarnation of the office of Lord 
Chancellor, described by Hartley and Griffith as “the living refutation of the doctrine of 
separation of powers in England”,20 provides the paradigmatic example.  
                                                 
17
 J.W.F. Allison, The English Historical Constitution: Continuity, Change and European Effects (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp.83-86. 
18
 See also: A. Tomkins, “Of Constitutional Spectres” [1999] P.L. 525, 532.  Cf. N. Bamforth, “Separation of 
Powers and Comparative Analysis” in K.S. Ziegler, D. Baranger and A.W. Bradley, Constitutionalism and the 
Role of Parliaments (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007), pp.177-179.  
19
 A. Tomkins, Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp.35-39.   
20
 T.C. Hartley and J.A.G. Griffith, Government and Law (2
nd
 ed) (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1981), 
p.179.   
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 Secondly, much of traditional English constitutional theory held that the division of 
power required by separation of powers was at odds with the unfettered legislative power of 
Parliament.
21
 Separation of powers, it has been argued, requires that no single branch of 
government wield disproportionate constitutional influence and that the institutions of 
government exercise a degree of coercive influence over each other.
22
 This leaves little space 
for separation of powers to co-exist with the core doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty 
which has traditionally determined that constitutional authority be organised hierarchically 
and allows little scope for the constitutional restraint of legislative authority.  
It is clear however that separation of powers has been employed – by the elected 
branches and by the courts – as both an objective of, and justification for, recent 
constitutional decisions. As such, neither the constitutional heritage of non-compliant 
structural arrangements nor the conceptual immobility of the sovereignty doctrine can 
provide a compelling and complete rejection of the place of separation of powers in 
contemporary constitutional discourse. Case law further challenges this conceptual rigidity, 
revealing a concept that is operative in judicial reasoning as a descriptive, rhetorical and 
normative device. Conceiving of separation of powers as less of an inflexible prescription, 
and more as an overarching principle of constitutional conduct
23
 or fluid encapsulation of 
constitutional dynamics,
24
 allows us to interpret variance from its institutional “template” 
sympathetically, permitting greater precision in calculating its influence in constitutional 
practice. By contrast with Marshall, who argues that the malleability of separation of powers 
results in uncertainty and normative weakness,
25
 we argue that flexibility is central to the 
place of separation of powers in the United Kingdom’s constitution and has allowed the 
doctrine to retain credence in the face of obstacles to its straightforward application.  
 
Deploying Separation of Powers in Judicial Reasoning 
                                                 
21
 J. Baker, “The unwritten constitution of the United Kingdom” [2013] E.C.L.J. 4, 10-19; C. Möllers, The 
Three Branches: A Comparative Model of Separation of Powers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 
pp.22-26. 
22
 E. Barendt, An Introduction to Constitutional Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.14-17.   
23
 J.W.F. Allison, The English Historical Constitution: Continuity, Change and European Effects (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), ch.4.  
24
 M. Elliott, The Constitutional Foundations of Judicial Review (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001), p.225-229.  
25
 G. Marshall, Constitutional Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), ch.5. 
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References to separation of powers concerns in judicial reasoning can tentatively be observed 
to reveal a series of approaches to the doctrine, each of which seeks the reconciliation of 
separation of powers with established features of a constitution which continues to be shaped 
(to a greater or lesser degree) by parliamentary sovereignty. Our argument outlines four 
judicial understandings of the doctrine that range from a hierarchical version carrying few 
independent normative implications (serving as little more than a ratification of parliamentary 
sovereignty), to the conceptualisation of the doctrine as a freestanding and fundamental 
principle of the constitutional structure. Resting between these variants are medial approaches 
that acknowledge the influence of separation of powers as distinct from parliamentary 
sovereignty, and recognise certain judicial powers as reserved to the courts. The weakly 
normative version carves out a conceptual space for an autonomous judicial role and is 
advanced by the articulation of specific, independently-held, judicial functions under the 
strongly normative approach. 
 
A hierarchical, or sovereignty-endorsing, separation of powers 
Separation of powers and parliamentary sovereignty are often portrayed as incompatible. 
There can be no effective division of powers, it is argued, when one institution of government 
lays claim to unlimited legal authority and its enactments – by mere virtue of that authority – 
are deemed to be constitutional.
26
 Yet parliamentary sovereignty does give rise to a 
separation of powers, if not one of legally co-equal branches. Acceptance that separation of 
powers might assume multiple forms facilitates an allocation of functions to branches of the 
state without necessarily assuming or demanding an equal distribution of power.   
It is commonplace that judicial reference to separation of powers acknowledges the 
existence of three branches of government and an apportionment of functions between them: 
“Parliament makes the law, the executive carry the law into effect and the judiciary enforce 
the law.”27 Hence legislative, executive and adjudicative functions are acknowledged to 
attach to three core branches of government. This minimalist version of separation of powers 
is a consequence of the legally superior position of the legislature and therefore “implicit in a 
constitution on the Westminster model.”28 Perhaps the most well-known invocation of 
                                                 
26
 E. Barendt, An Introduction to Constitutional Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.17.   
27
 M v Home Office [1994] 1 A.C. 377, 395.     
28
 Hinds v The Queen [1977] A.C. 195, 225. 
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separation of powers in this particular guise can be found in the House of Lords decision in 
Duport Steel v Sirs:
29
  
 
… it cannot be too strongly emphasised that the British constitution, though largely 
unwritten, is firmly based upon the separation of powers; Parliament makes the laws, 
the judiciary interpret them.
30
  
 
It would be incorrect to dismiss this approach as merely descriptive of constitutional 
practice,
31
 for the reason that behind this nominal allocation of powers can be found the 
underpinning normative influence of parliamentary supremacy.
32
 In Duport – cautioning 
against what he saw to be the overly activist interpretative approach of the Court of Appeal – 
Lord Diplock outlined the consequences of Parliament’s legally superior status:  
 
… the role of the judiciary is confined to ascertaining from the words that Parliament 
has approved as expressing its intention what that intention was, and to giving effect 
to it … under our constitution it is Parliament’s opinion … that is paramount.33 
 
The normative influence of the sovereignty doctrine can therefore be clearly seen to influence 
the constitutional division of powers. This separation is entirely consistent with the legally 
and constitutionally inferior, or subservient, role historically assumed by the courts, a role 
which can be understood as the necessary consequence of Parliament’s legal sovereignty.34 
Parliamentary supremacy may not be necessarily inconsistent with, or destructive of, 
separation of powers. Rather, it can be understood as generating a particular, hierarchical, 
                                                 
29
 Duport Steel v Sirs [1980] 1 W.L.R. 142.  
30
 Ibid., 157.   
31
 For the suggestion that separation of powers in the British context can only be regarded as descriptive see: A. 
Tomkins, Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p.38.   
32
 Indeed, Tomkins has elsewhere contended that parliamentary sovereignty, rather than separation of powers, is 
the precise focus of Lord Diplock’s remarks in Duport Steel (A. Tomkins, “Of Constitutional Spectres” [1999] 
P.L. 525, 531).   
33
 Duport Steel v Sirs [1980] 1 W.L.R. 142, 157.   
34
 See: R. Masterman and J. Murkens, “Skirting Supremacy and Subordination: The Constitutional Authority of 
the UK Supreme Court” [2013] P.L. 800, 802-804.  
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variant of the doctrine in which the legislature – though susceptible to the vital checks and 
balances of the political process
35
 – is regarded as being legally superior.  
The assumptions that flow from the recognition of the legislature as constitutionally 
superior to courts and executive can be seen to condition the courts’ interpretative role, and 
the regulation of power allocated to the executive. As Duport demonstrates, literal – or plain 
meaning – approaches to statutory construction are driven by the supremacy of the legislature 
and manifested in the courts’ attempts to give faithful effect to Parliament’s legislative intent. 
The roles of legislator and interpreter are acknowledged (indeed required) in this separation 
of powers, but the supremacy of the former – and the resulting judicial reverence for statutory 
language
36
 – determines (and limits) the approach to be taken by the interpreter. The 
formalist school of legislative interpretation, prominent in judicial attitudes and method for 
much of the twentieth century,
37
 is an emanation of this variation of separation of powers.   
The preservation of the determinative legislative authority of Parliament remains 
influential,
38
 even in the face of reform that considerably repositions the respective powers of 
the three branches vis-à-vis each other.
39
 The architects of the Human Rights Act 1998 were 
thus keen to emphasise the Act’s maintenance of this “traditional understanding of the 
separation of powers.”40 In giving effect to the courts’ obligations under the Act this 
hierarchical understanding of separation of powers is able to condition the extent to which the 
courts’ interpretative powers – under s.3(1) – might be utilised legitimately.41 Lord Millett, 
dissenting, in Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza noted that the “quasi-legislative” approach taken by 
                                                 
35
 See: R. v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Fire Brigades Union [1995] 2 A.C. 513, 544-
546; R. (on the application of Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5; 
[2017] 2 W.L.R. 583, [248]-[255].    
36
 G. Marshall, Constitutional Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), p.74.   
37
 R. Stevens, Law and Politics: The House of Lords as a Judicial Body, 1800-1976 (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1979), chs.10 and 11; J. Steyn, “Does legal formalism hold sway in England?” (1996) 49 Current 
Legal Problems 43.  
38
 R. (Jackson) v Attorney-General [2005] UKHL 56; [2006] 1 A.C. 262, [9] (Lord Bingham); R. (on the 
application of Evans) v Attorney-General [2015] UKSC 21; [2015] A.C. 1787, [168] (Lord Wilson). 
39
 K.D. Ewing, “The Human Rights Act and Parliamentary Democracy” (1999) 62 M.L.R. 79, 79.   
40
 HL Debs, vol. 582, col. 1228 (3 November 1997) (Lord Irvine of Lairg Q.C.).  See also: HC Debs, vol. 306, 
col. 772 (16 February 1998). 
41
 Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] 2 A.C. 557.   
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the majority to the use of s.3(1)
42
 – which permitted the reinterpretation of provisions of the 
Rent Act 1977 to achieve compliance with the requirements of Articles 8 and 12 of the 
Convention – may have been “appropriate where the constitution … is the supreme law” but 
“is not appropriate in the United Kingdom, which has no written constitution and where the 
prevailing constitutional doctrine is based on the supremacy of Parliament.”43 Millett’s view 
acknowledges a division of power between courts and legislature under which the judicial 
role is constrained by that which the constitution envisages should be undertaken by the 
legislature. It additionally highlights that the normative content of this particular division of 
governmental powers – the role of pseudo-independent interpreter – is contingent on the 
sovereignty doctrine, rather than an autonomous function of the courts.  
 Consistently with formalist approaches to statutory construction, the hierarchical 
approach to separation of powers does not completely eschew legal checks on government, 
instead attempting to explain them by reference to the legal supremacy of Parliament. Hence, 
conceptualisation of the court’s supervisory role in judicial review cases by reference to the 
ultra vires rule provides a representation of this hierarchical – sovereignty-endorsing – 
approach to separation of powers; the ultra vires theory “grounds judicial review firmly in the 
sovereignty of Parliament.”44 Under the ultra vires model, the courts’ powers of review exist 
in order to police the legality of statutory delegations of power to government and owe their 
authority to the inferred intention of Parliament that those powers be exercised in accordance 
with law.
45
 While it is clear that this understanding of separation of powers has informed self-
perceptions of the judicial role, the absence of a normative bite independent of the 
implications of parliamentary sovereignty precludes its full reconciliation with the aspiration 
of the doctrine to limit power through its division. Moreover, the hierarchical variant fails to 
provide a platform for creative (law-making) judicial functions and cannot fully account for 
judicial scrutiny of non-statutory governmental powers. The constitutional value of this 
variant is therefore undermined by its ability to offer only a partial account of the judicial role 
within the constitution.  
 
                                                 
42
 An approach evident elsewhere in s.3(1) jurisprudence: R. v A (No.2) [2001] UKHL 25; [2002] 1 A.C. 45; 
Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF (No.3) [2009] UKHL 28; [2010] 2 A.C. 269. 
43
 Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] 2 A.C. 557, 585.   
44
 J. Jowell, “Beyond the Rule of Law: Towards Constitutional Judicial Review” [2000] P.L. 671, 673.   
45
 Boddington v British Transport Police [1999] 2 A.C. 143, 164 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson).  
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The weakly normative variant 
Those accounts of separation of powers that demarcate autonomous judicial functions begin 
to provide a more holistic appreciation of the judicial role. By contrast with the hierarchical 
account of separation of powers, the weakly normative variant provides a positive 
endorsement of an independent judiciary rather than a negative suggestion that judicial 
functions are largely derivative of a higher constitutional authority. At a general level, the 
weakly normative variant of separation of powers:  
 
… requires the executive and the legislature to abstain from interference with the 
judicial function, and conversely requires the judiciary not to interfere with or to 
criticise the proceedings of the legislature. These basic principles lead to the 
requirement of mutual respect by the courts for the proceedings and decisions of the 
legislature and by the legislature (and the executive) for the proceedings and decisions 
of the courts.
46
  
 
As Stanley Burnton J suggests, the division and exercise of constitutional power by the 
judiciary should be understood as being conceptually autonomous of powers exercised by the 
other branches of state. Understood in this way, this conception of separation of powers 
becomes more than simple camouflage for the supremacy of the legislature, and envisages a 
parallel space in which the court’s independent judgment and authority carry weight. More 
specifically, whereas the hierarchical understanding of separation of powers focuses on the 
source of judicial power, weakly normative readings of separation of powers invite reflection 
on its extent. Though still acknowledging the ultimate primacy of the legislature, weakly 
normative readings of separation of powers recognise an autonomous judicial function that 
exists in the absence of any explicit or implicit conferral of power by way of legislative 
direction. This understanding acknowledges that:  
 
Independence makes the courts more suited to deciding some kinds of questions and 
being elected makes the legislature or executive more suited to deciding others … The 
                                                 
46
 Office of Government Commerce v Information Commissioner [2008] EWHC 774 (Admin); [2010] Q.B. 98, 
[46] (Stanley Burnton J). See also: Ahmed v HM Treasury [2010] UKSC 5; [2010] 2 A.C. 534, [85] (Lord 
Phillips).  
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principle that the independence of the courts is necessary for a proper decision of 
disputed legal rights or claims of violation of human rights is a legal principle.
47
 
  
The weakly normative variant can then be conceptually distinguished from (and seen as a 
necessary development of) the hierarchical approach, for the reason that it recognises the 
constitutional value of an autonomous judicial function that is independent of legislative, or 
assumed legislative, intent. It is within this understanding of separation of powers that the 
limited law-making powers of the courts
48
 and ability of the common law to legitimise 
judicial review – and recognise that non-statutory governmental powers may be susceptible to 
judicial scrutiny – most clearly reside. The common law theory of judicial review supports a 
system of judicial checks and balances that is not derivative of parliamentary authority.
49
 This 
variant is implicit in those specific cases where the courts have asserted a power to review 
exercises of non-statutory governmental powers,
50
 and in encapsulations of judicial review as 
– in the words of Baroness Hale in Cart – “an artefact of the common law whose object is to 
maintain the rule of law – that is to ensure that … decisions are taken in accordance with the 
law.”51 Baroness Hale implicitly recognises the supremacy of the legislature, but explicitly 
conceives of judicial review as an autonomous creation of the common law.
52
 The normative 
component of this variant of separation of powers therefore extends beyond policing that 
statutory delegations of power are exercised consistently with the intentions of the legislature 
and begins to underpin the courts’ independent role in upholding the rule of law.   
That the common law has come to recognise the existence of “constitutional or 
fundamental”53 rights – freedoms which do not owe their existence to legislation, yet may 
exert influence over its interpretation – provides a further illustration of the normative 
                                                 
47
 R. (on the application of ProLife Alliance) v British Broadcasting Corporation [2003] UKHL 23; [2004] 1 
A.C. 185, [76].  
48
 Lord Reid, “The Judge as Lawmaker” (1972) 12 Jnl Soc Public Teachers of Law 22; Ghaidan v Godin-
Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30; [2004] 2 A.C. 557, [30]-[36].  
49
 D. Oliver, “Is the ultra vires rule the basis of judicial review?” [1987] P.L. 543.  
50
 For instance: Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] A.C. 374: R. v Panel on 
Take-Overs and Mergers, ex parte Datafin [1987] Q.B. 815.     
51
 R. (on the application of Cart) v Upper Tribunal [2011] UKSC 28; [2012] 1 A.C. 663, [37].   
52
 See also: P. Craig, Admininstrative Law (6
th
 ed) (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2008), p.17.   
53
 Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin); [2003] Q.B. 151, [62].   
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influence of the common law over statute.
54
 In Witham Laws LJ famously found that 
constitutional rights at common law “can only be denied by the government if it persuades 
Parliament to pass legislation which specifically – in effect by express provision – permits” 
such limitation.
55
 By virtue of this approach to statutory construction – subsequently 
endorsed, and developed, at the highest judicial levels
56
 – interference with rights existent at 
common law is permitted, but only in so far as authorised by specific statutory direction. A 
linguistically surmountable check is therefore placed upon the ability of the legislature to 
interfere with those constitutional rights recognised by the common law. Weakly normative 
readings of separation of powers acknowledge, rather than assume, the constitutional 
superiority of the legislature, recognising that the “considered opinion of the legislature”57 
does – and should as a result of its democratic underpinnings – carry normative weight.  
 Though supportive of independently imposed checks and balances structures, in 
practice, weakly normative readings of separation of powers may also be characterised by 
occasionally deferential tendencies towards the legislature.
58
 While a hierarchical 
interpretation of separation of powers approaches the authority of primary legislation as an 
immovable object, the weakly normative approach sees deference to legislative authority as a 
matter of judgment rather than of routine. Lord Hoffmann’s rhetorically powerful speech in 
the ProLife Alliance case provides an example. In criticising the language of deference – 
noting the “overtones of servility, or perhaps gracious concession” that the term implied – 
Hoffmann rejected the notion that judicial authority should be regarded as being necessarily 
constitutionally secondary to the legislative power of Parliament. However, the decision of 
the House of Lords was almost certainly deferential towards the primary decision-maker as a 
matter of fact.
59
 A comparable tendency is visible in Lord Hoffmann’s famous speech in 
Simms.
60
 There Hoffmann hails the ability of the principle of legality to see courts enforcing 
powers of review (“principles of constitutionality”) not dissimilar to those exercised by 
                                                 
54
 See also: R. v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Leech [1994] Q.B. 198.   
55
 R. v Lord Chancellor, ex parte Witham [1998] Q.B. 575, 586.  
56
 R. (on the application of Buckinghamshire CC) v Secretary of State for Transport [2014] UKSC 3.  
57
 Wilson v First County Trust (No.2) [2003] UKHL 40; [2004] 1 A.C. 816, [112].   
58
 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] A.C. 374; R. (on the application of 
Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2008] UKHL 61; [2009] 1 A.C. 453.   
59
 R. (on the application of ProLife Alliance) v British Broadcasting Corporation [2004] 1 A.C. 185, [75].   
60
 R. v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Simms [2000] 2 A.C. 115.   
13 
 
explicitly constitutional courts, while simultaneously conceding (where legislative purpose is 
clear) Parliament’s ability to legislate absent legal constraints.61 
 
The strongly normative variant 
Strongly normative approaches to separation of powers have seen judges utilise the doctrine 
as being either substantially determinative of an adjudicative dispute, or as strongly 
supportive of the idea of specific (exclusive) judicial functions. Thus, this variant differs from 
the weakly normative approach by identifying judicial functions and showing willingness to 
enforce their reservation to the judicial branch. The division of tasks envisaged by this variant 
echoes the reflexive allocation of governmental functions discussed above – “[i]nterpretation 
of statutes is a matter for the courts; the enactment of statutes, and the amendment of statutes, 
are matters for Parliament”62 – but further envisages the articulation of exclusive, 
independent functions for the court. 
The sentencing context is one in which “the courts have begun to talk of the 
separation of powers in more juridical terms.”63 The judgment of Lord Steyn in Venables – 
expressing the House of Lords’ decision that when fixing a tariff for life sentence prisoners, 
the Secretary of State performs a role analogous to that of a judge and is consequently barred 
from taking account of public protests
64
 – can be seen to embrace the strongly normative 
approach. Evincing an embrace of exclusive judicial functions, Lord Steyn noted that “[i]n 
fixing a tariff the Home Secretary is carrying out, contrary to the constitutional principle of 
separation of powers, a classic judicial function.”65  
Following implementation of the Human Rights Act, further development of the 
strongly normative perspective was revealed in Anderson, with the House of Lords holding 
that the Home Secretary’s power to set tariffs for prisoners convicted of murder could not 
                                                 
61
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persist in light of the Article 6(1) ECHR requirement that tariffs be fixed by the judicial 
branch.
66
 Lord Steyn observed that “Article 6(1) requires effective separation of powers 
between the courts and the executive, and further requires that what can in shorthand be 
called judicial functions may only be exercised by the courts.”67 Consequently, Steyn spoke 
to “the evolution and strengthening of the principle of separation of powers between the 
executive and judiciary which underlies Article 6(1)” and the influence of this invigorated 
separation of powers on the development of Article 6 decisions relating to the sentencing 
exercise.
68
 The influence of the ECHR in this approach is undoubtable, and Lord Steyn’s 
comments portray a level of permeability in the doctrine, which allows it to absorb elements 
of the Convention. Accordingly, while to some eyes the court’s judgment may read as a 
legalistic application of the Convention, there is more to it; the approach also reflects a 
strongly normative separation of powers protective of an independent area of responsibility 
for the courts.
69
   
This strongly normative approach can be supported in four ways. First, by textual 
arguments, using enforceable norms that display separation of powers characteristics such as 
Article 6(1); second, by institutional arguments, which can take the form of articulating a 
function seen to be inherent in the nature of the judicial role on the basis of the rule of law or 
judicial independence; third, by reference to the allocation of certain functions to judicial 
bodies on the basis of the decision-making attributes of judicial processes or finally, the 
approach may be supported by invoking the constitutional responsibility of courts. The 
textual explanation emerges in the application of Article 6(1) as a requirement that sentencing 
rest within the exclusive domain of the courts. This was the support proffered for the strong 
normative stance that was adopted in Anderson. Beyond textual explanations, the exclusivity 
of certain functions can be justified by reference to the institutional virtues of the court and 
the procedural virtues of the curial process. Such was Laws LJ’s explanation of the 
interpretive function in Cart v Upper Tribunal:  
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The interpreter’s role cannot be fulfilled by the legislature or executive: for in that 
case they or either of them would be judge in their own cause, with the ills of arbitrary 
government which that would entail. Nor, generally, can the interpreter be constituted 
by the public body which has to administer the relevant law: for in that case the 
decision makers would write their own laws. The interpreter must be impartial, 
independent both of the legislature and of the persons affected by the text’s 
application, and authoritative – accepted as the last word, subject only to any appeal. 
Only a court can fulfil that role.
70
 
 
Based on Laws’ analysis, the virtues of the court as interpreter rest in the personal 
impartiality of the judge, the institutional independence of the judiciary, and the legal 
authority of court decisions.  
There is perhaps an instinctive constitutional appeal to ground the strongly normative 
approach in the inherent functions of the judiciary as, historically, one can point to functions 
that appear to be central to the judicial role. However, this form of support is self-limiting, 
relying on the elusive standard of “inherence”. As it is notoriously difficult to universally 
define the nature of judicial, executive, and legislative power, there are few tasks that could 
be said to be inherent in the function of any one branch.
71
 The “institutional virtues” 
approach, on the other hand, invites reflection on the process of judicial decision-making and 
a determination of functions that are suited to that form of decision-making. This view has 
the merit of drilling down to an underlying concern of the separation of powers, which is to 
allocate power to organs of government with regard to how that power will be exercised.
72
 
This approach therefore enables extension or limitation of strong normative use of the 
separation of powers in response to reasoned assessment of the suitability of the allocation of 
a particular decision or issue to an organ of the state.
73
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An alternative framing of the specific functions of the courts and the relationship 
between the judiciary and Parliament rests on an understanding of the “constitutional 
responsibility” of courts.74 The idea of constitutional responsibility is animated where there 
are issues touching upon individual rights, and requires courts to play a strong scrutinising 
and regulatory role, even in policy areas apparently clearly demarcated as being for the 
elected branches of government. Lord Hope has pointed to a constitutional responsibility of 
the courts where there exists the potential for discrimination in the distribution of public 
goods: 
 
Cases about discrimination in an area of social policy … will always be appropriate 
for judicial scrutiny. The constitutional responsibility in this area of our law resides 
with the courts. The more contentious the issue is, the greater the risk is that some 
people will be discriminated against in ways that engage their convention rights. It is 
for the courts to see that this does not happen. It is with them that the ultimate 
safeguard against discrimination rests.
75
 
 
This view of the constitutional role of the court reveals parallels between the strongly 
normative variant of the separation of powers and some strains of common law 
constitutionalism; recognition of exclusive functions for courts on the one hand and 
legislators on the other, in the strongly normative conception, mirrors a moderate articulation 
of common law constitutionalism as a model whereby the judiciary and Parliament each has 
its own constitutional sphere of operation. As T.R.S. Allan has argued, “only a strict division 
between legislator, executive government, and independent judiciary, marking the boundaries 
of separate jurisdictions, can preserve a sphere of individual autonomy in the face of state 
power.”76 In this sense, common law constitutionalism views the judiciary and Parliament as 
dominant within their own respective spheres,
77
 and remains adamant that under current 
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constitutional doctrine, Parliament has “the last clear and unequivocal word”78 insofar as 
primary legislation affirms “fundamental ideals of democracy and legality.”79 It is largely this 
view of the functions of, and relationship between, the institutions that is reflected in the 
strongly normative approach. 
Despite the above instances of strong normative application of the separation of 
powers, this approach to the doctrine is not commonly seen; the potent assertion in Anderson 
of the separation of judicial and executive powers required by Article 6(1) ECHR remains its 
high-water mark. Attempts to broaden the relevance and centrality of the separation of 
powers to the interpretation and enforcement of Article 6 have been less successful in 
subsequent cases. This is evidenced in Kehoe, in which Ward LJ was a lone voice 
maintaining that the correct approach for deciding whether a bar to access to the court 
violates Article 6(1) was to determine if the exclusion was one that contravened the 
separation of powers. While Ward LJ sought to emphasise the doctrine in resolving the 
dispute, the remaining Court of Appeal judges (and Law Lords) assessed the issue not as one 
that turned on consistency with the separation of powers, but rather on the existence of a civil 
right which an individual is prevented from claiming in courts due to a procedural bar erected 
by the statute.
80
 
Further reticence toward the strongly normative stance is revealed in the courts’ post-
Anderson preference for the practical requirements of Article 6 over reliance on the 
separation of powers as a determinative doctrine in fair trial cases. This realignment has 
eroded the doctrinal assistance supplied by Article 6 to effectuate a strong normative 
application of separation of powers. As a result, in Davidson v Scottish Ministers – 
concerning the consistency of simultaneously held judicial and executive roles with Article 6 
– Lord Hope was explicit that the decision be grounded in the practical requirements of the 
Convention and not on the “theory of the separation of powers alone”.81 The resettling of the 
application of Article 6 in a way that de-emphasises autonomous separation of powers 
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doctrine can be viewed as a reassertion of what has been referred to as “the English 
constitution’s long tradition of institutional pragmatism”, whereby the focus is on practical 
solutions to problems, rather than fealty to constitutional ideology.
82
  
The infrequency with which the strongly normative approach is employed is also 
perhaps indicative that the context of conviction and sentencing is exceptional, being one of 
few areas in United Kingdom constitutional law that has, over time, come to lend itself to 
claims of exclusivity on the part of the judiciary.
83
 Indeed, the limited reach of the strongly 
normative approach is an offshoot of the fact that “in classical English constitutional law, the 
idea of separated powers protects the independence of the courts from the executive”84 and 
thus, the independence of the judiciary is the most broadly and traditionally accepted aspect 
of the separation of powers.
85
 The independence of the judiciary occupies such a central and 
exalted place in the United Kingdom’s separation of powers that one judge has remarked that 
the separation of powers “in our Constitution is restricted to the judicial function of 
government.”86 From this perspective, it is difficult to envision further expansion of the 
strongly normative variant of the separation of powers. 
 
Separation of powers as a constitutional fundamental 
The fourth approach to separation of powers views the doctrine as a “fundamental” 
constitutional principle
87
 and “a constitutive element of democratic government”.88 The 
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“fundamental” approach to the separation of powers has been cross-institutional, with 
references to the doctrine as a “core constitutional principle”89 also appearing in 
parliamentary debates and Select Committee reports.
90
 The language of fundamentality 
would seem – at first glance – to signal the triumph of a strong form common law 
constitutionalist framework in which the courts are able to wield constitutional principles 
against legislation (and in which the corpus of judge-made law is viewed as tantamount to a 
free-standing constitutional framework).
91
 Yet, at the point at which separation of powers 
may be expected to have greatest normative value it can be seen to fall short. Thus, judicial 
attempts to enforce the separation of powers as a fundamental and free-standing 
constitutional principle have failed: “[a]rguments based on the theory of the separation of 
powers will not suffice.”92 Against this backdrop, it is perhaps unsurprising that Lord 
Neuberger in Evans v Attorney-General – in seeking to demarcate exclusive judicial functions 
through an explicitly “constitutional”93 approach to the Ministerial veto power in s.53 of the 
Freedom of Information Act 2000 – sought to ground his judgment in the more familiar 
constitutional terrain provided by the rule of law.
94
 Indeed, unlike the strongly normative 
version, the fundamental variant of separation of powers does not give rise to strong 
normative enforcement of separation of powers. Whereas the strongly normative variant 
prioritises practicality and effective problem solving, the articulation of separation of powers 
as a fundamental offers broader rhetorical support for the constitutional role of the doctrine.
 
Thus, while the fundamental variant of the separation of powers seems on the surface to 
project a vision of the constitution as higher-order law, the separation of powers doctrine is 
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not in practice so applied. The crux of this category then is that there is an apparent 
contradiction between rhetorical references to the doctrine and its practical application.  
There are three possible ways of accounting for this contradiction of practical 
constitutional significance and rhetorical usage. The first is to view judicial assertion that the 
separation of powers is “fundamental” as a statement that the doctrine is foundational to the 
constitutional system. Here, “fundamental” is used to connote a foundation of the existing 
constitutional structure rather than a higher order (constitutional) law.
95
 The Supreme Court 
has perhaps illuminated a path for incorporating the notion of fundamental principles into 
interpretive practice. Elucidation of the principle of legality in AXA indicates that the court 
will be slow to find that fundamental principles have been abrogated by legislation and will 
require that such a legislative intention be communicated through express words or necessary 
inference.
96
 It was in this vein that Lords Neuberger and Mance stated in the HS2 judgment 
“that there may be fundamental principles, whether contained in other constitutional 
instruments or recognised at common law, of which Parliament when it enacted the European 
Communities Act 1972 did not either contemplate or authorise the abrogation.”97  
A further mechanism that clarifies the judicial articulation of the separation of powers 
as fundamental is to draw another critical distinction – between the separation of powers as a 
doctrine and judicial power to enforce it. Thus, while the separation of powers may achieve 
recognition as a constitutional principle, this is separate from the question whether it may be 
enforced by judges and, if it is enforceable, whether it is opposable against the legislature as 
well as the executive. The distinction between the existence and recognition of a norm on the 
one hand, and enforceability on the other, is not new to the law and has been invoked in the 
field of socio-economic rights to distinguish between the existence of a justiciable right and 
the extent of the state’s duties to respect and promote rights.98 The realm of constitutional law 
also reveals distinctions between recognition and enforcement in relation to judicial 
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enforcement of conventions.
99
 Thus, there is much precedent for making the distinction 
between recognising the separation of powers as a fundamental constitutional principle while 
failing to enforce it as a strong normative principle in the courts.  
Finally, the distinction between fundamentality and institutional enforcement power 
can be partly explained by considering the methodological trajectory behind the 
“fundamental” statements in Anderson. Lord Steyn’s speech in Anderson cited Privy Council 
case-law from common law jurisdictions in which there is both a written constitution and 
jurisdiction to invalidate legislation on the ground of fundamental constitutional principles. 
The cases referred to in the House of Lords included judgments from Australia
100
, Ceylon
101
 
and Jamaica,
102
 in which the separation of powers was characterised as a “fundamental 
principle” applicable to legislation in constitutional review. In those cases there was a 
confluence of fundamental constitutional character and institutional power, yet in Anderson 
the context was quite different, with neither the constitution nor Human Rights Act providing 
explicit support for a comparably robust assertion of constitutional principle. Accordingly, 
while in Anderson the separation of powers could be applied to practical effect through 
Article 6 of the Convention and section 4 of the Human Rights Act, in other cases the Act 
might not provide the vehicle through which the separation of powers can have such practical 
impact. Thus, the limited practical application of the conception of the separation of powers 
as a fundamental and/or constitutional principle serves to underscore Elliott’s observation 
that “because the British system is not … a constitution of absolutes, the extent to which 
fundamental principles can be upheld by courts is necessarily a function of the legislative and 
institutional circumstances with which they are confronted.”103 
 
Embracing the variable separation of powers 
The understandings of separation of powers outlined above confirm much of the malleability 
that a number of critics have used to damn the doctrine and to question its relevance to the 
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United Kingdom constitution. However, given that relative fluidity is one of the 
constitution’s enduring characteristics, rejection of separation of powers – based on the 
inherent flexibility of the doctrine alone – is difficult to support. It is at least arguable, for 
instance, that the rule of law can be seen to suffer from the same defect, and yet its place in 
the constitutional milieu is broadly undisputed.
104
 Acceptance that “our constitution has never 
embraced a rigid separation of powers”105 allows conceptualisation of separation of powers as 
a continuum (or an “ethos”106), rather than a single, rigid, template of institutional design or 
power allocation. Acknowledging that separation of powers admits of multiple variants, each 
enjoying related, but distinct, meanings, not only emphasises the relevance of the doctrine to 
our constitutional discourse but permits closer examination of its normative potential and 
reveals a deeper resonance with existing doctrine and practice than has often been accepted.  
 The core imperative of separation of powers is to act as “a safeguard against the 
concentration of power”.107 It is this feature of the flexible model that ensures its internal 
coherence; despite persistent contestation of the central attributes of the separation of powers, 
its objectives and effects, its central objective is to distribute state power.
108
 The proposed 
variable understanding requires divided power, but acknowledges and permits variations in 
the precise functional distribution achieved in order to afford contextual recognition to, and 
balance, co-existing constitutional imperatives (including parliamentary sovereignty, 
individual rights and considerations of relative institutional competence). The adaptability of 
the doctrine partially explains the continuing resonance of separation of powers, and reveals 
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far richer understandings of the concept than have traditionally been acknowledged in 
uncritical assertions of the United Kingdom’s “partial” separation of powers.109 
Each of the models advanced here is concerned with the allocation of power and with 
its regulation. But each differs in its emphasis and mode of operation; from the bare 
acknowledgement that the interpretive function is derivative of – but distinct from – 
legislative authority, to the increasingly potent suggestions that judicial power enjoys an 
autonomous normative status and that specific judicial functions should be reserved to the 
courts. Each model is also concerned with guaranteeing checks and balances; with the 
spectrum ranging from the legally minimalist and ultra vires approaches of the hierarchical 
variant to the suggestions of a free-standing and determinative doctrine of separated powers 
and a fully-fledged common law constitution. The further we move along the spectrum away 
from the hierarchical version, the greater the potential of an enforceable separation of powers 
to independently defend constitutional imperatives such as liberty and the rule of law. 
Paradoxically, in the United Kingdom constitutional order, a shift away from the hierarchical 
variant has the consequence that the doctrine becomes less judicially enforceable as its 
strength must be tempered by – and may come into conflict with – other constitutional 
doctrines, not least of which is parliamentary sovereignty.  
 While assertions of a strongly normative variant of separation of powers – or indeed 
claims as to its fundamentality – certainly enjoy greater rhetorical potency, they 
simultaneously lack practical force. The greater the normative claim made on behalf of 
separation of powers in the United Kingdom constitution, the weaker its legal (juridical) 
purchase becomes. The enforceability of a strongly normative separation of powers is 
therefore seemingly limited to those circumstances in which its requirements run 
concurrently with co-existing legal doctrine. This does not result in the complete diminution 
of the shaping influence of separation of powers; the doctrine may assume broader, 
prospective significance in constitutional framing and constitutional reform efforts. Rather, 
there is a point at which its utility as a tool of judicial reasoning becomes rhetorical and 
ceases to exert a meaningful conditioning influence on the outcome of the case at hand. Some 
judges may well regard separation of powers as a free-standing constitutional fundamental, 
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but it is not so fundamental to the United Kingdom constitution that it will, in the abstract, 
determine the outcome of litigation.
110
  
 A fluid understanding of separation of powers is arguably consistent with the 
incremental development of, and institutional pragmatism inherent in, the constitution. 
Several commentators have argued that the Human Rights Act precipitated a step-change in 
the relationship between the United Kingdom constitution and separation of powers, 
evidencing a conceptual shift away from viewing separation of powers as a “political ideal” 
towards understanding it as a concept holding the capacity to be “judicially enforceable.”111 
There is, of course, a degree of truth to this suggestion; strongly normative assertions of 
separation of powers have been given succour by the jurisprudence on Article 6(1) ECHR, 
while assertions of the fundamentality of the doctrine have drawn heavily on the (related) 
jurisprudential rhetoric of the European Court of Human Rights.
112
 But both the hierarchical 
and weakly normative understandings of the doctrine remain juridical tools with far deeper 
constitutional underpinnings. The hierarchical model explicitly takes its lead from the 
foundational doctrine of sovereignty, while the weakly normative variant clearly 
acknowledges the continuing influence of legislative supremacy. Even in his notable 
articulation of a stronger variant of the doctrine in Anderson, Lord Steyn was careful to 
identify the supremacy of Parliament as “the paramount principle of our constitution.”113 So 
to suggest that the Human Rights Act marked an unprecedented departure from past practice 
would be to overstate what should actually be recognised as a further incremental 
development of longstanding principles.  
A more accurate assessment of the doctrine’s development and its place in the United 
Kingdom constitution is that as there has been a shift in institutional relationships, the 
separation of powers has evolved in tandem with those changes. This shift has seen the court 
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exercise powers of “quasi-constitutional review”114 in relation to legislation impacting upon 
human rights standards, the competences of devolved institutions of government, and the 
interplay between national and supra-national legal norms.
115
 The notion of separation of 
powers serves as a guide to the boundaries of the powers and responsibilities of the courts 
vis-à-vis Parliament, providing an analytical framework as well as a reminder that while 
institutional boundaries continue to shift, the core duty of the courts in relation to legislation 
(including under the Human Rights Act) remains interpretive.
116
 Drawing this connection 
reveals the continuum that exists between pre- and post-Human Rights Act cases and the 
subtlety of the doctrine’s evolution in the Human Rights Act era. More radical assertions of 
judicial power may be visible, but they remain largely exceptional.
117
 Acknowledging the 
modesty of this conceptual shift – given the infrequency with which separation of powers is 
articulated in its strongly normative form – demonstrates that while the prevailing judicial 
vision of separation of powers may evidence a movement towards (weak) normativity it has 
not seen the courts lose sight of more longstanding constitutional assumptions. 
 
Conclusion 
The spectrum of separation of powers sketched here provides both a lens through which the 
judicial role can be understood and explained and a litmus test of the doctrine’s 
enforceability. Separation of powers is neither a constitutional irrelevance, nor a free-
standing and judicially-enforceable constitutional doctrine, yet it remains an important tool in 
the explanation and assessment of constitutional power in the United Kingdom. Occupying a 
constitutional space that permits its co-existence (and allows for overlap) with parliamentary 
sovereignty and the rule of law, it conditions judicial self-perception, seeks to explain the 
bases of judicial power and places limitations on the exercise of those powers.  
 Our analysis has demonstrated that, at the general level, separation of powers is a 
fluid, but commonly-used, feature of judicial decision-making. But it is wrong to dismiss the 
doctrine as lacking normative bite. Though the hierarchical variant owes its rudimentary 
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separation of functions to the sovereignty doctrine – and remains influential upon formalistic 
approaches to legislative interpretation
118
 and potentially inhibiting of judicial oversight of 
politicised questions
119
 – it also offers an incomplete account of actual judicial role and 
function. More realistically, the weakly and strongly normative understandings of the 
doctrine require judicial independence and provide conceptual backing to the articulation of 
explicitly judicial functions. The former recognises judicial autonomy and underpins the 
constitutional practice of judicial review; the latter begins to carve out a space for the 
articulation of explicitly judicial functions, but is deployed only insofar as those functions can 
be reinforced by doctrinal support for judicial independence. In consequence, a modest shift 
towards a juridical separation of powers may well have occurred, but the normativity of the 
doctrine remains uneven and contextual.  
Even at the soft end of the functional spectrum where the doctrine lacks judicial 
enforceability, other constitutional actors nonetheless have recourse to separation of powers 
language to inform extra-judicial debate. Utilised to shape and contextualise constitutional 
developments, separation of powers performs a broader constitutional function by framing 
and informing political and legal debate. While the want of formal (judicial) enforceability 
undoubtedly weakens the claims of those who would see separation of powers conceptualised 
as a true constitutional fundamental, the political constitution is all too familiar with softer 
tools of constitutional regulation.
120
 Seen in this light, separation of powers remains a vital 
tool of constitutional argumentation even when it does not operate as a positive, judicially-
enforceable norm.  
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